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Character Improvement 
Nicomachean Ethics
by Aristotle
350 BC
translated by W. D. Ross
Book 4, Chapter 1
Let us speak next of liberality. It seems to be the
mean with regard to wealth; for the liberal man is praised not in respect of
military matters, nor of those in respect of which the temperate man is praised,
nor of judicial decisions, but with regard to the giving and taking of wealth,
and especially in respect of giving. Now by 'wealth' we mean all the things
whose value is measured by money. Further, prodigality and meanness are excesses
and defects with regard to wealth; and meanness we always impute to those who
care more than they ought for wealth, but we sometimes apply the word
'prodigality' in a complex sense; for we call those men prodigals who are
incontinent and spend money on self-indulgence. Hence also they are thought the
poorest characters; for they combine more vices than one. Therefore the
application of the word to them is not its proper use; for a 'prodigal' means a
man who has a single evil quality, that of wasting his substance; since a
prodigal is one who is being ruined by his own fault, and the wasting of
substance is thought to be a sort of ruining of oneself, life being held to
depend on possession of substance.
This, then, is the sense in which we take the word 'prodigality'. Now the
things that have a use may be used either well or badly; and riches is a useful
thing; and everything is used best by the man who has the virtue concerned with
it; riches, therefore, will be used best by the man who has the virtue concerned
with wealth; and this is the liberal man. Now spending and giving seem to be the
using of wealth; taking and keeping rather the possession of it. Hence it is
more the mark of the liberal man to give to the right people than to take from
the right sources and not to take from the wrong. For it is more characteristic
of virtue to do good than to have good done to one, and more characteristic to
do what is noble than not to do what is base; and it is not hard to see that
giving implies doing good and doing what is noble, and taking implies having
good done to one or not acting basely. And gratitude is felt towards him who
gives, not towards him who does not take, and praise also is bestowed more on
him. It is easier, also, not to take than to give; for men are apter to give
away their own too little than to take what is another's. Givers, too, are
called liberal; but those who do not take are not praised for liberality but
rather for justice; while those who take are hardly praised at all. And the
liberal are almost the most loved of all virtuous characters, since they are
useful; and this depends on their giving.
Now virtuous actions are noble and done for the sake of the noble. Therefore
the liberal man, like other virtuous men, will give for the sake of the noble,
and rightly; for he will give to the right people, the right amounts, and at the
right time, with all the other qualifications that accompany right giving; and
that too with pleasure or without pain; for that which is virtuous is pleasant
or free from pain -- least of all will it be painful. But he who gives to the
wrong people or not for the sake of the noble but for some other cause, will be
called not liberal but by some other name. Nor is he liberal who gives with
pain; for he would prefer the wealth to the noble act, and this is not
characteristic of a liberal man. But no more will the liberal man take from
wrong sources; for such taking is not characteristic of the man who sets no
store by wealth. Nor will he be a ready asker; for it is not characteristic of a
man who confers benefits to accept them lightly. But he will take from the right
sources, e.g. from his own possessions, not as something noble but as a
necessity, that he may have something to give. Nor will he neglect his own
property, since he wishes by means of this to help others. And he will refrain
from giving to anybody and everybody, that he may have something to give to the
right people, at the right time, and where it is noble to do so. It is highly
characteristic of a liberal man also to go to excess in giving, so that he
leaves too little for himself; for it is the nature of a liberal man not to look
to himself. The term 'liberality' is used relatively to a man's substance; for
liberality resides not in the multitude of the gifts but in the state of
character of the giver, and this is relative to the giver's substance. There is
therefore nothing to prevent the man who gives less from being the more liberal
man, if he has less to give those are thought to be more liberal who have not
made their wealth but inherited it; for in the first place they have no
experience of want, and secondly all men are fonder of their own productions, as
are parents and poets. It is not easy for the liberal man to be rich, since he
is not apt either at taking or at keeping, but at giving away, and does not
value wealth for its own sake but as a means to giving. Hence comes the charge
that is brought against fortune, that those who deserve riches most get it
least. But it is not unreasonable that it should turn out so; for he cannot have
wealth, any more than anything else, if he does not take pains to have it. Yet
he will not give to the wrong people nor at the wrong time, and so on; for he
would no longer be acting in accordance with liberality, and if he spent on
these objects he would have nothing to spend on the right objects. For, as has
been said, he is liberal who spends according to his substance and on the right
objects; and he who exceeds is prodigal. Hence we do not call despots prodigal;
for it is thought not easy for them to give and spend beyond the amount of their
possessions. Liberality, then, being a mean with regard to giving and taking of
wealth, the liberal man will both give and spend the right amounts and on the
right objects, alike in small things and in great, and that with pleasure; he
will also take the right amounts and from the right sources. For, the virtue
being a mean with regard to both, he will do both as he ought; since this sort
of taking accompanies proper giving, and that which is not of this sort is
contrary to it, and accordingly the giving and taking that accompany each other
are present together in the same man, while the contrary kinds evidently are
not. But if he happens to spend in a manner contrary to what is right and noble,
he will be pained, but moderately and as he ought; for it is the mark of virtue
both to be pleased and to be pained at the right objects and in the right way.
Further, the liberal man is easy to deal with in money matters; for he can be
got the better of, since he sets no store by money, and is more annoyed if he
has not spent something that he ought than pained if he has spent something that
he ought not, and does not agree with the saying of Simonides.
The prodigal errs in these respects also; for he is neither pleased nor
pained at the right things or in the right way; this will be more evident as we
go on. We have said that prodigality and meanness are excesses and deficiencies,
and in two things, in giving and in taking; for we include spending under
giving. Now prodigality exceeds in giving and not taking, while meanness falls
short in giving, and exceeds in taking, except in small things.
The characteristics of prodigality are not often combined; for it is not
easy to give to all if you take from none; private persons soon exhaust their
substance with giving, and it is to these that the name of prodigals is applied
-- though a man of this sort would seem to be in no small degree better than a
mean man. For he is easily cured both by age and by poverty, and thus he may
move towards the middle state. For he has the characteristics of the liberal
man, since he both gives and refrains from taking, though he does neither of
these in the right manner or well. Therefore if he were brought to do so by
habituation or in some other way, he would be liberal; for he will then give to
the right people, and will not take from the wrong sources. This is why he is
thought to have not a bad character; it is not the mark of a wicked or ignoble
man to go to excess in giving and not taking, but only of a foolish one. The man
who is prodigal in this way is thought much better than the mean man both for
the aforesaid reasons and because he benefits many while the other benefits no
one, not even himself.
But most prodigal people, as has been said, also take from the wrong
sources, and are in this respect mean. They become apt to take because they wish
to spend and cannot do this easily; for their possessions soon run short. Thus
they are forced to provide means from some other source. At the same time,
because they care nothing for honour, they take recklessly and from any source;
for they have an appetite for giving, and they do not mind how or from what
source. Hence also their giving is not liberal; for it is not noble, nor does it
aim at nobility, nor is it done in the right way; sometimes they make rich those
who should be poor, and will give nothing to people of respectable character,
and much to flatterers or those who provide them with some other pleasure. Hence
also most of them are self-indulgent; for they spend lightly and waste money on
their indulgences, and incline towards pleasures because they do not live with a
view to what is noble.
The prodigal man, then, turns into what we have described if he is left
untutored, but if he is treated with care he will arrive at the intermediate and
right state. But meanness is both incurable (for old age and every disability is
thought to make men mean) and more innate in men than prodigality; for most men
are fonder of getting money than of giving. It also extends widely, and is
multiform, since there seem to be many kinds of meanness.
For it consists in two things, deficiency in giving and excess in taking,
and is not found complete in all men but is sometimes divided; some men go to
excess in taking, others fall short in giving. Those who are called by such
names as 'miserly', 'close', 'stingy', all fall short in giving, but do not
covet the possessions of others nor wish to get them. In some this is due to a
sort of honesty and avoidance of what is disgraceful (for some seem, or at least
profess, to hoard their money for this reason, that they may not some day be
forced to do something disgraceful; to this class belong the cheeseparer and
every one of the sort; he is so called from his excess of unwillingness to give
anything); while others again keep their hands off the property of others from
fear, on the ground that it is not easy, if one takes the property of others
oneself, to avoid having one's own taken by them; they are therefore content
neither to take nor to give.
Others again exceed in respect of taking by taking anything and from any
source, e.g. those who ply sordid trades, pimps and all such people, and those
who lend small sums and at high rates. For all of these take more than they
ought and from wrong sources. What is common to them is evidently sordid love of
gain; they all put up with a bad name for the sake of gain, and little gain at
that. For those who make great gains but from wrong sources, and not the right
gains, e.g. despots when they sack cities and spoil temples, we do not call mean
but rather wicked, impious, and unjust. But the gamester and the footpad (and
the highwayman) belong to the class of the mean, since they have a sordid love
of gain. For it is for gain that both of them ply their craft and endure the
disgrace of it, and the one faces the greatest dangers for the sake of the
booty, while the other makes gain from his friends, to whom he ought to be
giving. Both, then, since they are willing to make gain from wrong sources, are
sordid lovers of gain; therefore all such forms of taking are mean.
And it is natural that meanness is described as the contrary of liberality;
for not only is it a greater evil than prodigality, but men err more often in
this direction than in the way of prodigality as we have described it.
So much, then, for liberality and the opposed vices.
Book 4, Chapter 2
It would seem proper to discuss magnificence next. For this also seems to be
a virtue concerned with wealth; but it does not like liberality extend to all
the actions that are concerned with wealth, but only to those that involve
expenditure; and in these it surpasses liberality in scale. For, as the name
itself suggests, it is a fitting expenditure involving largeness of scale. But
the scale is relative; for the expense of equipping a trireme is not the same as
that of heading a sacred embassy. It is what is fitting, then, in relation to
the agent, and to the circumstances and the object. The man who in small or
middling things spends according to the merits of the case is not called
magnificent (e.g. the man who can say 'many a gift I gave the wanderer'), but
only the man who does so in great things. For the magnificent man is liberal,
but the liberal man is not necessarily magnificent. The deficiency of this state
of character is called niggardliness, the excess vulgarity, lack of taste, and
the like, which do not go to excess in the amount spent on right objects, but by
showy expenditure in the wrong circumstances and the wrong manner; we shall
speak of these vices later.
The magnificent man is like an artist; for he can see what is fitting and
spend large sums tastefully. For, as we said at the begining, a state of
character is determined by its activities and by its objects. Now the expenses
of the magnificent man are large and fitting. Such, therefore, are also his
results; for thus there will be a great expenditure and one that is fitting to
its result. Therefore the result should be worthy of the expense, and the
expense should be worthy of the result, or should even exceed it. And the
magnificent man will spend such sums for honour's sake; for this is common to
the virtues. And further he will do so gladly and lavishly; for nice calculation
is a niggardly thing. And he will consider how the result can be made most
beautiful and most becoming rather than for how much it can be produced and how
it can be produced most cheaply. It is necessary, then, that the magnificent man
be also liberal. For the liberal man also will spend what he ought and as he
ought; and it is in these matters that the greatness implied in the name of the
magnificent man -- his bigness, as it were -- is manifested, since liberality is
concerned with these matters; and at an equal expense he will produce a more
magnificent work of art. For a possession and a work of art have not the same
excellence. The most valuable possession is that which is worth most, e.g. gold,
but the most valuable work of art is that which is great and beautiful (for the
contemplation of such a work inspires admiration, and so does magnificence); and
a work has an excellence -- viz. magnificence -- which involves magnitude.
Magnificence is an attribute of expenditures of the kind which we call
honourable, e.g. those connected with the gods -- votive offerings, buildings,
and sacrifices -- and similarly with any form of religious worship, and all
those that are proper objects of public-spirited ambition, as when people think
they ought to equip a chorus or a trireme, or entertain the city, in a brilliant
way. But in all cases, as has been said, we have regard to the agent as well and
ask who he is and what means he has; for the expenditure should be worthy of his
means, and suit not only the result but also the producer. Hence a poor man
cannot be magnificent, since he has not the means with which to spend large sums
fittingly; and he who tries is a fool, since he spends beyond what can be
expected of him and what is proper, but it is right expenditure that is
virtuous. But great expenditure is becoming to those who have suitable means to
start with, acquired by their own efforts or from ancestors or connexions, and
to people of high birth or reputation, and so on; for all these things bring
with them greatness and prestige. Primarily, then, the magnificent man is of
this sort, and magnificence is shown in expenditures of this sort, as has been
said; for these are the greatest and most honourable. Of private occasions of
expenditure the most suitable are those that take place once for all, e.g. a
wedding or anything of the kind, or anything that interests the whole city or
the people of position in it, and also the receiving of foreign guests and the
sending of them on their way, and gifts and counter-gifts; for the magnificent
man spends not on himself but on public objects, and gifts bear some resemblance
to votive offerings. A magnificent man will also furnish his house suitably to
his wealth (for even a house is a sort of public ornament), and will spend by
preference on those works that are lasting (for these are the most beautiful),
and on every class of things he will spend what is becoming; for the same things
are not suitable for gods and for men, nor in a temple and in a tomb. And since
each expenditure may be great of its kind, and what is most magnificent
absolutely is great expenditure on a great object, but what is magnificent here
is what is great in these circumstances, and greatness in the work differs from
greatness in the expense (for the most beautiful ball or bottle is magnificent
as a gift to a child, but the price of it is small and mean), -- therefore it is
characteristic of the magnificent man, whatever kind of result he is producing,
to produce it magnificently (for such a result is not easily surpassed) and to
make it worthy of the expenditure.
Such, then, is the magnificent man; the man who goes to excess and is vulgar
exceeds, as has been said, by spending beyond what is right. For on small
objects of expenditure he spends much and displays a tasteless showiness; e.g.
he gives a club dinner on the scale of a wedding banquet, and when he provides
the chorus for a comedy he brings them on to the stage in purple, as they do at
Megara. And all such things he will do not for honour's sake but to show off his
wealth, and because he thinks he is admired for these things, and where he ought
to spend much he spends little and where little, much. The niggardly man on the
other hand will fall short in everything, and after spending the greatest sums
will spoil the beauty of the result for a trifle, and whatever he is doing he
will hesitate and consider how he may spend least, and lament even that, and
think he is doing everything on a bigger scale than he ought.
These states of character, then, are vices; yet they do not bring disgrace
because they are neither harmful to one's neighbour nor very unseemly.
Book 4, Chapter 3
Pride seems even from its name to be concerned with great things; what sort
of great things, is the first question we must try to answer. It makes no
difference whether we consider the state of character or the man characterized
by it. Now the man is thought to be proud who thinks himself worthy of great
things, being worthy of them; for he who does so beyond his deserts is a fool,
but no virtuous man is foolish or silly. The proud man, then, is the man we have
described. For he who is worthy of little and thinks himself worthy of little is
temperate, but not proud; for pride implies greatness, as beauty implies a
goodsized body, and little people may be neat and well-proportioned but cannot
be beautiful. On the other hand, he who thinks himself worthy of great things,
being unworthy of them, is vain; though not every one who thinks himself worthy
of more than he really is worthy of in vain. The man who thinks himself worthy
of worthy of less than he is really worthy of is unduly humble, whether his
deserts be great or moderate, or his deserts be small but his claims yet
smaller. And the man whose deserts are great would seem most unduly humble; for
what would he have done if they had been less? The proud man, then, is an
extreme in respect of the greatness of his claims, but a mean in respect of the
rightness of them; for he claims what is accordance with his merits, while the
others go to excess or fall short.
If, then, he deserves and claims great things, and above all the great
things, he will be concerned with one thing in particular. Desert is relative to
external goods; and the greatest of these, we should say, is that which we
render to the gods, and which people of position most aim at, and which is the
prize appointed for the noblest deeds; and this is honour; that is surely the
greatest of external goods. Honours and dishonours, therefore, are the objects
with respect to which the proud man is as he should be. And even apart from
argument it is with honour that proud men appear to be concerned; for it is
honour that they chiefly claim, but in accordance with their deserts. The unduly
humble man falls short both in comparison with his own merits and in comparison
with the proud man's claims. The vain man goes to excess in comparison with his
own merits, but does not exceed the proud man's claims.
Now the proud man, since he deserves most, must be good in the highest
degree; for the better man always deserves more, and the best man most.
Therefore the truly proud man must be good. And greatness in every virtue would
seem to be characteristic of a proud man. And it would be most unbecoming for a
proud man to fly from danger, swinging his arms by his sides, or to wrong
another; for to what end should he do disgraceful acts, he to whom nothing is
great? If we consider him point by point we shall see the utter absurdity of a
proud man who is not good. Nor, again, would he be worthy of honour if he were
bad; for honour is the prize of virtue, and it is to the good that it is
rendered. Pride, then, seems to be a sort of crown of the virtues; for it makes
them greater, and it is not found without them. Therefore it is hard to be truly
proud; for it is impossible without nobility and goodness of character. It is
chiefly with honours and dishonours, then, that the proud man is concerned; and
at honours that are great and conferred by good men he will be moderately
Pleased, thinking that he is coming by his own or even less than his own; for
there can be no honour that is worthy of perfect virtue, yet he will at any rate
accept it since they have nothing greater to bestow on him; but honour from
casual people and on trifling grounds he will utterly despise, since it is not
this that he deserves, and dishonour too, since in his case it cannot be just.
In the first place, then, as has been said, the proud man is concerned with
honours; yet he will also bear himself with moderation towards wealth and power
and all good or evil fortune, whatever may befall him, and will be neither
over-joyed by good fortune nor over-pained by evil. For not even towards honour
does he bear himself as if it were a very great thing. Power and wealth are
desirable for the sake of honour (at least those who have them wish to get
honour by means of them); and for him to whom even honour is a little thing the
others must be so too. Hence proud men are thought to be disdainful.
The goods of fortune also are thought to contribute towards pride. For men
who are well-born are thought worthy of honour, and so are those who enjoy power
or wealth; for they are in a superior position, and everything that has a
superiority in something good is held in greater honour. Hence even such things
make men prouder; for they are honoured by some for having them; but in truth
the good man alone is to be honoured; he, however, who has both advantages is
thought the more worthy of honour. But those who without virtue have such goods
are neither justified in making great claims nor entitled to the name of
'proud'; for these things imply perfect virtue. Disdainful and insolent,
however, even those who have such goods become. For without virtue it is not
easy to bear gracefully the goods of fortune; and, being unable to bear them,
and thinking themselves superior to others, they despise others and themselves
do what they please. They imitate the proud man without being like him, and this
they do where they can; so they do not act virtuously, but they do despise
others. For the proud man despises justly (since he thinks truly), but the many
do so at random.
He does not run into trifling dangers, nor is he fond of danger, because he
honours few things; but he will face great dangers, and when he is in danger he
is unsparing of his life, knowing that there are conditions on which life is not
worth having. And he is the sort of man to confer benefits, but he is ashamed of
receiving them; for the one is the mark of a superior, the other of an inferior.
And he is apt to confer greater benefits in return; for thus the original
benefactor besides being paid will incur a debt to him, and will be the gainer
by the transaction. They seem also to remember any service they have done, but
not those they have received (for he who receives a service is inferior to him
who has done it, but the proud man wishes to be superior), and to hear of the
former with pleasure, of the latter with displeasure; this, it seems, is why
Thetis did not mention to Zeus the services she had done him, and why the
Spartans did not recount their services to the Athenians, but those they had
received. It is a mark of the proud man also to ask for nothing or scarcely
anything, but to give help readily, and to be dignified towards people who enjoy
high position and good fortune, but unassuming towards those of the middle
class; for it is a difficult and lofty thing to be superior to the former, but
easy to be so to the latter, and a lofty bearing over the former is no mark of
ill-breeding, but among humble people it is as vulgar as a display of strength
against the weak. Again, it is characteristic of the proud man not to aim at the
things commonly held in honour, or the things in which others excel; to be
sluggish and to hold back except where great honour or a great work is at stake,
and to be a man of few deeds, but of great and notable ones. He must also be
open in his hate and in his love (for to conceal one's feelings, i.e. to care
less for truth than for what people will think, is a coward's part), and must
speak and act openly; for he is free of speech because he is contemptuous, and
he is given to telling the truth, except when he speaks in irony to the vulgar.
He must be unable to make his life revolve round another, unless it be a friend;
for this is slavish, and for this reason all flatterers are servile and people
lacking in self-respect are flatterers. Nor is he given to admiration; for
nothing to him is great. Nor is he mindful of wrongs; for it is not the part of
a proud man to have a long memory, especially for wrongs, but rather to overlook
them. Nor is he a gossip; for he will speak neither about himself nor about
another, since he cares not to be praised nor for others to be blamed; nor again
is he given to praise; and for the same reason he is not an evil-speaker, even
about his enemies, except from haughtiness. With regard to necessary or small
matters he is least of all me given to lamentation or the asking of favours; for
it is the part of one who takes such matters seriously to behave so with respect
to them. He is one who will possess beautiful and profitless things rather than
profitable and useful ones; for this is more proper to a character that suffices
to itself.
Further, a slow step is thought proper to the proud man, a deep voice, and a
level utterance; for the man who takes few things seriously is not likely to be
hurried, nor the man who thinks nothing great to be excited, while a shrill
voice and a rapid gait are the results of hurry and excitement.
Such, then, is the proud man; the man who falls short of him is unduly
humble, and the man who goes beyond him is vain. Now even these are not thought
to be bad (for they are not malicious), but only mistaken. For the unduly humble
man, being worthy of good things, robs himself of what he deserves, and to have
something bad about him from the fact that he does not think himself worthy of
good things, and seems also not to know himself; else he would have desired the
things he was worthy of, since these were good. Yet such people are not thought
to be fools, but rather unduly retiring. Such a reputation, however, seems
actually to make them worse; for each class of people aims at what corresponds
to its worth, and these people stand back even from noble actions and
undertakings, deeming themselves unworthy, and from external goods no less. Vain
people, on the other hand, are fools and ignorant of themselves, and that
manifestly; for, not being worthy of them, they attempt honourable undertakings,
and then are found out; and tetadorn themselves with clothing and outward show
and such things, and wish their strokes of good fortune to be made public, and
speak about them as if they would be honoured for them. But undue humility is
more opposed to pride than vanity is; for it is both commoner and worse.
Pride, then, is concerned with honour on the grand scale, as has been said.
Book 4, Chapter 4
There seems to be in the sphere of honour also, as was said in our first
remarks on the subject, a virtue which would appear to be related to pride as
liberality is to magnificence. For neither of these has anything to do with the
grand scale, but both dispose us as is right with regard to middling and
unimportant objects; as in getting and giving of wealth there is a mean and an
excess and defect, so too honour may be desired more than is right, or less, or
from the right sources and in the right way. We blame both the ambitious man as
am at honour more than is right and from wrong sources, and the unambitious man
as not willing to be honoured even for noble reasons. But sometimes we praise
the ambitious man as being manly and a lover of what is noble, and the
unambitious man as being moderate and self-controlled, as we said in our first
treatment of the subject. Evidently, since 'fond of such and such an object' has
more than one meaning, we do not assign the term 'ambition' or 'love of honour'
always to the same thing, but when we praise the quality we think of the man who
loves honour more than most people, and when we blame it we think of him who
loves it more than is right. The mean being without a name, the extremes seem to
dispute for its place as though that were vacant by default. But where there is
excess and defect, there is also an intermediate; now men desire honour both
more than they should and less; therefore it is possible also to do so as one
should; at all events this is the state of character that is praised, being an
unnamed mean in respect of honour. Relatively to ambition it seems to be
unambitiousness, and relatively to unambitiousness it seems to be ambition,
while relatively to both severally it seems in a sense to be both together. This
appears to be true of the other virtues also. But in this case the extremes seem
to be contradictories because the mean has not received a name.
Book 4, Chapter 5
Good temper is a mean with respect to anger; the middle state being unnamed,
and the extremes almost without a name as well, we place good temper in the
middle position, though it inclines towards the deficiency, which is without a
name. The excess might called a sort of 'irascibility'. For the passion is
anger, while its causes are many and diverse.
The man who is angry at the right things and with the right people, and,
further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought, is praised. This
will be the good-tempered man, then, since good temper is praised. For the
good-tempered man tends to be unperturbed and not to be led by passion, but to
be angry in the manner, at the things, and for the length of time, that the rule
dictates; but he is thought to err rather in the direction of deficiency; for
the good-tempered man is not revengeful, but rather tends to make allowances.
The deficiency, whether it is a sort of 'inirascibility' or whatever it is,
is blamed. For those who are not angry at the things they should be angry at are
thought to be fools, and so are those who are not angry in the right way, at the
right time, or with the right persons; for such a man is thought not to feel
things nor to be pained by them, and, since he does not get angry, he is thought
unlikely to defend himself; and to endure being insulted and put up with insult
to one's friends is slavish.
The excess can be manifested in all the points that have been named (for one
can be angry with the wrong persons, at the wrong things, more than is right,
too quickly, or too long); yet all are not found in the same person. Indeed they
could not; for evil destroys even itself, and if it is complete becomes
unbearable. Now hot-tempered people get angry quickly and with the wrong persons
and at the wrong things and more than is right, but their anger ceases quickly
-- which is the best point about them. This happens to them because they do not
restrain their anger but retaliate openly owing to their quickness of temper,
and then their anger ceases. By reason of excess choleric people are
quick-tempered and ready to be angry with everything and on every occasion;
whence their name. Sulky people are hard to appease, and retain their anger
long; for they repress their passion. But it ceases when they retaliate; for
revenge relieves them of their anger, producing in them pleasure instead of
pain. If this does not happen they retain their burden; for owing to its not
being obvious no one even reasons with them, and to digest one's anger in
oneself takes time. Such people are most troublesome to themselves and to their
dearest friends. We call had-tempered those who are angry at the wrong things,
more than is right, and longer, and cannot be appeased until they inflict
vengeance or punishment.
To good temper we oppose the excess rather than the defect; for not only is
it commoner since revenge is the more human), but bad-tempered people are worse
to live with.
What we have said in our earlier treatment of the subject is plain also from
what we are now saying; viz. that it is not easy to define how, with whom, at
what, and how long one should be angry, and at what point right action ceases
and wrong begins. For the man who strays a little from the path, either towards
the more or towards the less, is not blamed; since sometimes we praise those who
exhibit the deficiency, and call them good-tempered, and sometimes we call angry
people manly, as being capable of ruling. How far, therefore, and how a man must
stray before he becomes blameworthy, it is not easy to state in words; for the
decision depends on the particular facts and on perception. But so much at least
is plain, that the middle state is praiseworthy -- that in virtue of which we
are angry with the right people, at the right things, in the right way, and so
on, while the excesses and defects are blameworthy -- slightly so if they are
present in a low degree, more if in a higher degree, and very much if in a high
degree. Evidently, then, we must cling to the middle state. -- Enough of the
states relative to anger.
Book 4, Chapter 6
In gatherings of men, in social life and the interchange of words and deeds,
some men are thought to be obsequious, viz. those who to give pleasure praise
everything and never oppose, but think it their duty 'to give no pain to the
people they meet'; while those who, on the contrary, oppose everything and care
not a whit about giving pain are called churlish and contentious. That the
states we have named are culpable is plain enough, and that the middle state is
laudable -- that in virtue of which a man will put up with, and will resent, the
right things and in the right way; but no name has been assigned to it, though
it most resembles friendship. For the man who corresponds to this middle state
is very much what, with affection added, we call a good friend. But the state in
question differs from friendship in that it implies no passion or affection for
one's associates; since it is not by reason of loving or hating that such a man
takes everything in the right way, but by being a man of a certain kind. For he
will behave so alike towards those he knows and those he does not know, towards
intimates and those who are not so, except that in each of these cases he will
behave as is befitting; for it is not proper to have the same care for intimates
and for strangers, nor again is it the same conditions that make it right to
give pain to them. Now we have said generally that he will associate with people
in the right way; but it is by reference to what is honourable and expedient
that he will aim at not giving pain or at contributing pleasure. For he seems to
be concerned with the pleasures and pains of social life; and wherever it is not
honourable, or is harmful, for him to contribute pleasure, he will refuse, and
will choose rather to give pain; also if his acquiescence in another's action
would bring disgrace, and that in a high degree, or injury, on that other, while
his opposition brings a little pain, he will not acquiesce but will decline. He
will associate differently with people in high station and with ordinary people,
with closer and more distant acquaintances, and so too with regard to all other
differences, rendering to each class what is befitting, and while for its own
sake he chooses to contribute pleasure, and avoids the giving of pain, he will
be guided by the consequences, if these are greater, i.e. honour and expediency.
For the sake of a great future pleasure, too, he will inflict small pains.
The man who attains the mean, then, is such as we have described, but has
not received a name; of those who contribute pleasure, the man who aims at being
pleasant with no ulterior object is obsequious, but the man who does so in order
that he may get some advantage in the direction of money or the things that
money buys is a flatterer; while the man who quarrels with everything is, as has
been said, churlish and contentious. And the extremes seem to be contradictory
to each other because the mean is without a name.
Book 4, Chapter 7
The mean opposed to boastfulness is found in almost the same sphere; and
this also is without a name. It will be no bad plan to describe these states as
well; for we shall both know the facts about character better if we go through
them in detail, and we shall be convinced that the virtues are means if we see
this to be so in all cases. In the field of social life those who make the
giving of pleasure or pain their object in associating with others have been
described; let us now describe those who pursue truth or falsehood alike in
words and deeds and in the claims they put forward. The boastful man, then, is
thought to be apt to claim the things that bring glory, when he has not got
them, or to claim more of them than he has, and the mock-modest man on the other
hand to disclaim what he has or belittle it, while the man who observes the mean
is one who calls a thing by its own name, being truthful both in life and in
word, owning to what he has, and neither more nor less. Now each of these
courses may be adopted either with or without an object. But each man speaks and
acts and lives in accordance with his character, if he is not acting for some
ulterior object. And falsehood is in itself mean and culpable, and truth noble
and worthy of praise. Thus the truthful man is another case of a man who, being
in the mean, is worthy of praise, and both forms of untruthful man are culpable,
and particularly the boastful man.
Let us discuss them both, but first of all the truthful man. We are not
speaking of the man who keeps faith in his agreements, i.e. in the things that
pertain to justice or injustice (for this would belong to another virtue), but
the man who in the matters in which nothing of this sort is at stake is true
both in word and in life because his character is such. But such a man would
seem to be as a matter of fact equitable. For the man who loves truth, and is
truthful where nothing is at stake, will still more be truthful where something
is at stake; he will avoid falsehood as something base, seeing that he avoided
it even for its own sake; and such a man is worthy of praise. He inclines rather
to understate the truth; for this seems in better taste because exaggerations
are wearisome.
He who claims more than he has with no ulterior object is a contemptible
sort of fellow (otherwise he would not have delighted in falsehood), but seems
futile rather than bad; but if he does it for an object, he who does it for the
sake of reputation or honour is (for a boaster) not very much to be blamed, but
he who does it for money, or the things that lead to money, is an uglier
character (it is not the capacity that makes the boaster, but the purpose; for
it is in virtue of his state of character and by being a man of a certain kind
that he is boaster); as one man is a liar because he enjoys the lie itself, and
another because he desires reputation or gain. Now those who boast for the sake
of reputation claim such qualities as will praise or congratulation, but those
whose object is gain claim qualities which are of value to one's neighbours and
one's lack of which is not easily detected, e.g. the powers of a seer, a sage,
or a physician. For this reason it is such things as these that most people
claim and boast about; for in them the above-mentioned qualities are found.
Mock-modest people, who understate things, seem more attractive in
character; for they are thought to speak not for gain but to avoid parade; and
here too it is qualities which bring reputation that they disclaim, as Socrates
used to do. Those who disclaim trifling and obvious qualities are called humbugs
and are more contemptible; and sometimes this seems to be boastfulness, like the
Spartan dress; for both excess and great deficiency are boastful. But those who
use understatement with moderation and understate about matters that do not very
much force themselves on our notice seem attractive. And it is the boaster that
seems to be opposed to the truthful man; for he is the worse character.
Book 4, Chapter 8
Since life includes rest as well as activity, and in this is included
leisure and amusement, there seems here also to be a kind of intercourse which
is tasteful; there is such a thing as saying -- and again listening to -- what
one should and as one should. The kind of people one is speaking or listening to
will also make a difference. Evidently here also there is both an excess and a
deficiency as compared with the mean. Those who carry humour to excess are
thought to be vulgar buffoons, striving after humour at all costs, and aiming
rather at raising a laugh than at saying what is becoming and at avoiding pain
to the object of their fun; while those who can neither make a joke themselves
nor put up with those who do are thought to be boorish and unpolished. But those
who joke in a tasteful way are called ready-witted, which implies a sort of
readiness to turn this way and that; for such sallies are thought to be
movements of the character, and as bodies are discriminated by their movements,
so too are characters. The ridiculous side of things is not far to seek,
however, and most people delight more than they should in amusement and in
jestinly. and so even buffoons are called ready-witted because they are found
attractive; but that they differ from the ready-witted man, and to no small
extent, is clear from what has been said.
To the middle state belongs also tact; it is the mark of a tactful man to
say and listen to such things as befit a good and well-bred man; for there are
some things that it befits such a man to say and to hear by way of jest, and the
well-bred man's jesting differs from that of a vulgar man, and the joking of an
educated man from that of an uneducated. One may see this even from the old and
the new comedies; to the authors of the former indecency of language was
amusing, to those of the latter innuendo is more so; and these differ in no
small degree in respect of propriety. Now should we define the man who jokes
well by his saying what is not unbecoming to a well-bred man, or by his not
giving pain, or even giving delight, to the hearer? Or is the latter definition,
at any rate, itself indefinite, since different things are hateful or pleasant
to different people? The kind of jokes he will listen to will be the same; for
the kind he can put up with are also the kind he seems to make. There are, then,
jokes he will not make; for the jest is a sort of abuse, and there are things
that lawgivers forbid us to abuse; and they should, perhaps, have forbidden us
even to make a jest of such. The refined and well-bred man, therefore, will be
as we have described, being as it were a law to himself.
Such, then, is the man who observes the mean, whether he be called tactful
or ready-witted. The buffoon, on the other hand, is the slave of his sense of
humour, and spares neither himself nor others if he can raise a laugh, and says
things none of which a man of refinement would say, and to some of which he
would not even listen. The boor, again, is useless for such social intercourse;
for he contributes nothing and finds fault with everything. But relaxation and
amusement are thought to be a necessary element in life.
The means in life that have been described, then, are three in number, and
are all concerned with an interchange of words and deeds of some kind. They
differ, however, in that one is concerned with truth; and the other two with
pleasantness. Of those concerned with pleasure, one is displayed in jests, the
other in the general social intercourse of life.
Book 4, Chapter 9
Shame should not be described as a virtue; for it is more like a feeling
than a state of character. It is defined, at any rate, as a kind of fear of
dishonour, and produces an effect similar to that produced by fear of danger;
for people who feel disgraced blush, and those who fear death turn pale. Both,
therefore, seem to be in a sense bodily conditions, which is thought to be
characteristic of feeling rather than of a state of character.
The feeling is not becoming to every age, but only to youth. For we think
young people should be prone to the feeling of shame because they live by
feeling and therefore commit many errors, but are restrained by shame; and we
praise young people who are prone to this feeling, but an older person no one
would praise for being prone to the sense of disgrace, since we think he should
not do anything that need cause this sense. For the sense of disgrace is not
even characteristic of a good man, since it is consequent on bad actions (for
such actions should not be done; and if some actions are disgraceful in very
truth and others only according to common opinion, this makes no difference; for
neither class of actions should be done, so that no disgrace should be felt);
and it is a mark of a bad man even to be such as to do any disgraceful action.
To be so constituted as to feel disgraced if one does such an action, and for
this reason to think oneself good, is absurd; for it is for voluntary actions
that shame is felt, and the good man will never voluntarily do bad actions. But
shame may be said to be conditionally a good thing; if a good man does such
actions, he will feel disgraced; but the virtues are not subject to such a
qualification. And if shamelessness -- not to be ashamed of doing base actions
-- is bad, that does not make it good to be ashamed of doing such actions.
Continence too is not virtue, but a mixed sort of state; this will be shown
later. Now, however, let us discuss justice.
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