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The Calculus of Logic
by
George Boole
Cambridge and Dublin Mathematical Journal
Vol. III (1848), pp. 18398
In a work lately published
(1) I have exhibited the application of a new and peculiar form of
Mathematics to the expression of the operations of the mind in
reasoning. In the present essay I design to offer such an account of
a portion of this treatise as may furnish a correct view of the
nature of the system developed. I shall endeavour to state distinctly
those positions in which its characteristic distinctions consist, and
shall offer a more particular illustration of some features which are
less prominently displayed in the original work. The part of the
system to which I shall confine my observations is that which treats
of categorical propositions, and the positions which, under this
limitation, I design to illustrate, are the following:
(1) That the business of Logic is with the relations of classes, and
with the modes in which the mind contemplates those relations.
(2) That antecedently to our recognition of the existence of
propositions, there are laws to which the conception of a class is
subject,  laws which are dependent upon the constitution of the
intellect, and which determine the character and form of the
reasoning process.
(3) That those laws are capable of mathematical expression, and that
they thus constitute the basis of an interpretable calculus.
(4) That those laws are, furthermore, such, that all equations which
are formed in subjection to them, even though expressed under
functional signs, admit of perfect solution, so that every problem in
logic can be solved by reference to a general theorem.
(5) That the forms under which propositions are actually exhibited, in
accordance with the principles of this calculus, are analogous with
those of a philosophical language.
(6) That although the symbols of the calculus do not depend for their
interpretation upon the idea of quantity, they nevertheless, in their
particular application to syllogism, conduct us to the quantitative
conditions of inference.
It is specially of the two last of these positions that I here desire
to offer illustration, they having been but partially exemplified in
the work referred to. Other points will, however, be made the
subjects of incidental discussion. It will be necessary to premise
the following notation.
The universe of conceivable objects is represented by 1 or unity.
This I assume as the primary and subject conception. All subordinate
conceptions of class are understood to be formed from it by
limitation, according to the following scheme.
Suppose that we have the conception of any group of objects consisting
of Xs, Ys, and others, and that
x, which we
shall call an elective symbol, represents the mental operation of
selecting from that group all the Xs which it contains, or
of fixing the attention upon the Xs to the exclusion of all
which are not Xs,
y the mental operation of selecting the
Ys, and so on; then, 1 or the universe being the subject
conception, we shall have
x 1 or x = the class X,
y 1 or y = the class Y,
xy 1 or xy = the class each member of which is
both X and Y,
and so on.
In like manner we shall have
1  x = the class notX,
1  y = the class notY,
x(1  y) = the class whose members are Xs but
notYs,
(1  x)(1  y) = the class whose members are neither Xs
nor Ys,
&c.
Furthermore, from consideration of the nature of the mental operation
involved, it will appear that the following laws are satisfied.
Representing by
x,
y,
z any elective symbols whatever,
x(y+z) = xy + xz
 . . . . . . . .(1),

xy = yx, &c.
 . . . . . . . .(2),

x = x, &c.
 . . . . . . . .(3). 
From the first of these it is seen that elective symbols are
distributive in their operation; from the second that they are
commutative. The third I have termed the index law; it is
peculiar to elective symbols.
The truth of these laws does not at all depend upon the nature, or the
number, or the mutual relations, of the individuals included in the
different classes. There may be but one individual in a class, or
there may be a thousand. There may be individuals common to different
classes, or the classes may be mutually exclusive. All elective
symbols are distributive, and commutative, and all elective symbols
satisfy the law expressed by (3).
These laws are in fact embodied in every spoken or written language.
The equivalence of the expressions ``good wise man'' and ``wise good
man,'' is not a mere truism, but an assertion of the law of
commutation exhibited in (2). And there are similar
illustrations of the other laws.
With these laws there is connected a general axiom. We have seen that
algebraic operations performed with elective symbols represent mental
processes. Thus the connexion of two symbols by the sign +
represents the aggregation of two classes into a single class, the
connexion of two symbols
xy as in multiplication, represents the
mental operation of selecting from a class Y those members
which belong also to another class X, and so on. By such
operations the conception of a class is modified. But beside this the
mind has the power of perceiving relations of equality among classes.
The axiom in question, then, is that
if a relation of equality
is perceived between two classes, that relation remains unaffected
when both subjects are equally modified by the operations above
described. (A). This axiom, and not ``Aristotle's dictum,'' is the
real foundation of all reasoning, the form and character of the
process being, however, determined by the three laws already stated.
It is not only true that every elective symbol representing a class
satisfies the index law (3), but it may be rigorously
demonstrated that any combination of elective symbols
(
xyz..),
which satisfies the law
(
xyz..)
=
(
xyz..),
represents
an intelligible conception,  a group or class defined by a greater or
less number of properties and consisting of a greater or less number
of parts.
The four categorical propositions upon which the doctrine of ordinary
syllogism is founded, are
All Ys are Xs.  A, 
No Ys are Xs.  E, 
Some Ys are Xs.  I, 
Some Ys are not Xs.  O. 
We shall consider these with reference to the classes among which
relation is expressed.
A. The expression All Ys represents the class Y
and will therefore be expressed by
y, the copula are by the
sign =, the indefinite term, Xs, is equivalent to
Some Xs. It is a convention of language, that the word
Some is expressed in the subject, but not in the predicate of a
proposition. The term Some Xs will be expressed by
vx,
in which
v is an elective symbol appropriate to a
class V, some members of which are Xs, but which
is in other respects arbitrary. Thus the proposition A
will be expressed by the equation
y = vx . . . . . . . .(4).
E.
(2) In the proposition, No Ys are Xs, the
negative particle appears to be attached to the subject instead of to
the predicate to which it manifestly belongs.
We do not intend to say that those things which are notYs
are Xs, but that things which are Ys are
notXs. Now the class notXs is expressed by
1 
x; hence the proposition No Ys are Xs, or
rather All Ys are notXs, will be expressed by
y = v(1  x) . . . . . . . .(5).
I. In the proposition Some Ys are Xs, or Some
Ys are Some Xs, we might regard the Some in the
subject and the Some in the predicate as having reference to the same
arbitrary class V, and so write
vy = vx,
but it is less of an assumption to refrain from doing this. Thus we
should write
vy = v'
x . . . . . . . .(6),
v'
referring to another arbitrary class
V
'
.
O. Similarly, the proposition Some Ys are
notXs, will be expressed by the equation
vy = v'
(1  x) . . . . . . . .(7).
It will be seen from the above that the forms under which the four
categorical propositions A, E, I, O are exhibited in the notation of
elective symbols are analogous with those of pure language,
i.e. with the forms which human speech would assume, were its
rules entirely constructed upon a scientific basis. In a vast
majority of the propositions which can be conceived by the mind, the
laws of expression have not been modified by usage, and the analogy
becomes more apparent,
e.g. the interpretation of the equation
z = x(1  y) + y(1  x),
is, the class Z consists of all Xs which are
notYs and of all Ys which are
notXs.
General Theorems relating to Elective Functions.
We have now arrived at this step,  that we are in possession of a
class of symbols
x,
y,
z, &c. satisfying certain laws, and
applicable to the rigorous expression of any categorical proposition
whatever. It will be our next business to exhibit a few of the
general theorems of the calculus which rest upon the basis of those
laws, and these theorems we shall afterwards apply to the discussion
of particular examples.
Of the general theorems I shall only exhibit two sets: those which
relate to the development of functions, and those which relate to the
solution of equations.
Theorems of Development.
(1) If
x be any elective symbol, then
(x)
= (1) x
+ (0) (1  x) . . . . . . . .(8),
the coefficients
(1),
(0),
which are quantitative or common algebraic functions, are called
the moduli, and
x and 1 
x the constituents.
(2) For a function of two elective symbols we have
(xy)
= (11)xy
+ (10) x(1  y)
+ (01)(1  x)y
+ (00)(1  x)(1  y)
. . . . . . . .(9),
in which
(11),
(10), &c.
are quantitative, and are called the moduli, and
xy,
x(1 
y), &c. the constituents.
(3) Functions of three symbols:
(xyz)
= (111)xyz
+ (110)xy(1  z)
+ (101)x(1  y)z
+ (100)x(1  y)(1  z)
+ (011)(1  x)yz
+ (010)(1  x)y(1  z)
+ (001)xy(1  z)
+ (000)(1  x)(1  y)(1  z)
. . . . . . . .(10),
in which
(111),
(110), &c.
are the moduli, and
xyz,
xy(1 
z), &c.
the constituents.
From these examples the general law of development is obvious. And I
desire it to be noted that this law is a mere consequence of the
primary laws which have been expressed in (1),
(2), (3).
THEOREM.
If we have any equation
(xyz..) = 0,
and fully expand the first member, then every constituent whose
modulus does not vanish may be equated to 0.
This enables us to interpret any equation by a general rule.
RULE.
Bring all the terms to the first side, expand
this in terms of all the elective symbols involved in it, and equate
to 0 every constituent whose modulus does not vanish.
For the demonstration of these and many other results, I must refer to
the original work. It must be noted that on p. 66,
z has been,
through mistake, substituted for
w, and that the reference on p. 80
should be to Prop. 2.
As an example, let us take the equation
x + 2y  3xy = 0 . . . . . . . .(11).
Here
(
xy)
=
x + 2
y  3
xy,
whence the values of the moduli are
(11) = 0,
(10) = 1,
(01) = 2,
(00) = 0,
so that the expansion (9) gives
x(1  y) + 2y(1  x) = 0,
which is in fact only another form of (11). We have, then,
by the Rule
x(1  y) = 0 . . . . . . . .(11),
y(1  x) = 0 . . . . . . . .(12);
the former implies that there are no Xs which are
notYs, the latter that there are no Ys which
are notXs, these together expressing the full significance
of the original equation.
We can, however, often recombine the constituents with a gain of
simplicity. In the present instance, subtracting (12) from
(11), we have
x 
y =
0, or
x =
y, that is, the
class X is identical with the class Y. This
proposition is equivalent to the two former ones.
All equations are thus of equal significance which give, on expansion,
the same series of constituent equations, and
all are
interpretable.
General Solution of Elective Equations.
(1) The general solution of the equation
(
xy) = 0,
in which two
elective symbols only are involved,
y being the one whose value is
sought, is
The coefficients
are here the moduli.
(2) The general solution of the equation
(
xyz) = 0,
z being the symbol whose value is to be determined, is
the coefficients of which we shall still term the moduli. The law of
their formation will readily be seen, so that the general theorems
which have been given for the solution of elective equations of two
and three symbols, may be regarded as examples of a more general
theorem applicable to all elective equations whatever. in applying
these results it is to be observed, that if a modulus assume the form
0/0 it is to be replaced by an arbitrary elective
symbol
w, and that if a modulus assume any numerical value except
0 or 1, the constituent of which it is a factor must be separately
equated to 0. Although these conditions are deduced solely from the
laws to which the symbols are obedient, and without any reference to
interpretation, they nevertheless render the solution of every
equation interpretable in logic. To such formulae also
every
question upon the relations of classes may be referred. One or two
very simple illustrations may suffice.
(1) Given
yx =
yz +
x(1 
z)
. . . . . . . . (
a).
The Ys which are Xs consist of the Ys
which are Zs and the Xs which are
notZs. Required the class Z.
Here
(
xyz)
=
yx 
yz 
x(1 
z),
(111) = 0,
(110) = 0,
(101) = 0,
(100) = 1,
(011) = 1,
(010) = 0,
(001) = 0,
(000) = 0;
and substituting in (14), we have
z = 0/0 xy + x(1  y)
+ 0/0 (1  x)(1  y)
= x(1  y) + wxy
+ w'
(1  x)(1  y) . . . . . . . .(15).
(3) Hence the class Z includes all Xs which are
notYs, an indefinite number of Xs which are
Ys, and an indefinite number of individuals which are
neither Xs nor Ys. The classes
w and
w'
being quite arbitrary, the indefinite remainder is equally so; it may
vanish or not.
Since 1 
z represents a class, notZ, and satisfies the
index law
(1  z) = 1  z,
as is evident on trial, we may, if we choose, determine the value of
this element just as we should determine that of
z.
Let us take, in illustration of this principle, the equation
y =
vx,
(All Ys are Xs), and seek the value of 1 
x,
the class notX.
Put 1 
x =
z then
y =
v(1 
z),
and if we write this in the form
y 
v(1 
z) = 0 and represent the first member by
(vyz),
v here taking the place of
x, in (14), we shall have
(111) = 1,
(110) = 0,
(101) = 0,
(100) = 1,
(011) = 1,
(010) = 1,
(001) = 0,
(000) = 0;
the solution will thus assume the form
or
1  x = v(1  y) + 1/0 (1  v)y + 0/0 (1  v)(1  y)
. . . . . . . .(16).
The infinite coefficient of the second term in the second member
permits us to write
y(1  v) = 0 . . . . . . . .(17),
the coefficient 0/0 being then replaced by
w, an
arbitrary elective symbol, we have
1  x = v(1  y) + w(1  v)(1  y),
or
1  x = {v + w(1  v)} (1  y)
. . . . . . . .(18).
We may remark upon this result that the coefficient
v +
w(1 
v) in
the second member satisfies the condition
{v + w(1  v)}
= v + w(1  v),
as is evident on squaring it. It therefore represents a
class.
We may replace it by an elective symbol
u, we have then
1  x = u(1  y) . . . . . . . .(19),
the interpretation of which is
All notXs are notYs.
This is a known transformation in logic, and is called conversion by
contraposition, or negative conversion. But it is far from exhausting
the solution we have obtained. Logicians have overlooked the fact,
that when we convert the proposition All Ys are (some)
Xs into All notXs are (some) notYs
there is a relation between the two (
somes), understood in the
predicates. The equation (18) shews that whatever may be
that condition which limits the Xs in the original
proposition,  the notYs in the converted proposition
consist of all which are subject to the same condition, and of an
arbitrary remainder which are not subject to that condition. The
equation (17) further shews that there are no Ys
which are not subject to that condition.
We can similarly reduce the equation
y =
v(1 
x),
No Ys are Xs, to the form
x =
v'
(1 
y)
No Xs are Ys, with a like relation between
v and
v'
.
If we solve
the equation
y =
vx All Ys are Xs, with
reference to
v, we obtain the subsidiary relation
y(1 
x) = 0
No Ys are notXs, and similarly from the equation
y =
v(1 
x) (No Ys are Xs) we get
xy = 0. These equations, which may also be obtained in other ways,
I have employed in the original treatise. All equations whose
interpretations are connected are similarly connected themselves, by
solution or development.
On Syllogism.
The forms of categorical propositions already deduced are
y = vx,
 All Ys are Xs, 
y = v(1  x),
 No Ys are Xs, 
vy = v' x,
 Some Ys are Xs, 
vy = v' (1  x),
 Some Ys are notXs, 
whereof the two first give, by solution,
1 
x =
v'
(1 
y).
All notXs are notYs,
x =
v'
(1 
y),
No Xs are Ys. To the above scheme, which is that
of Aristotle, we might annex the four categorical propositions
1  y = vx,
 All notYs are Xs, 
1  y = v(1  x),
 All notYs are notXs, 
v(1  y) = v' x,
 Some notYs are Xs, 
v(1  y) = v' (1  x),
 Some notYs are notXs, 
the first two of which are similarly convertible into
1  x = v' y,
  All notXs are Ys, 
x = v' y,
  All Xs are Ys, 
 or  No notXs are Ys, 
If now the two premises of any syllogism are expressed by equations of
the above forms, the elimination of the common symbol
y will lead us
to an equation expressive of the conclusion.
Ex. 1.  All Ys are Xs,
 y = vx, 
 All Zs are Ys,
 z = v' y, 
the elimination of
y gives
z = vv'
x,
the interpretation of which is
All Zs are Xs,
the form of the coefficient
vv'
indicates that the
predicate of the
conclusion is limited by both the conditions which separately limit
the predicates of the premises.
Ex. 2.  All Ys are Xs,
 y = vx, 
 All Ys are Zs,
 y = v' z. 
The elimination of
y gives
v'
z = vx,
which is interpretable into Some Zs are Xs. It
is always necessary that one term of the conclusion should be
interpretable by means of the equations of the premises. In the above
case both are so.
Ex. 3.  All Xs are Ys,
 x = vy, 
 No Zs are Ys,
 z = v' (1  y). 
Instead of directly eliminating
y let either equation be transformed
by solution as in (19). The first gives
1  y = u(1  x),
u being equivalent to
v +
w(1 
v),
in which
w is arbitrary.
Eliminating 1 
y between this and the second equation of the
system, we get
z = v'
u(1  x),
the interpretation of which is
No Zs are Xs.
Had we directly eliminated
y, we should have had
vz = v'
(v  x),
the reduced solution of which is
z = v'
{v + (1  v)}(1  x),
in which
w is an arbitrary elective symbol. This exactly agrees
with the former result.
These examples may suffice to illustrate the employment of the method
in particular instances. But its applicability to the demonstration
of general theorems is here, as in other cases, a more important
feature. I subjoin the results of a recent investigation of the Laws
of Syllogism. While those results are characterized by great
simplicity and bear, indeed, little trace of their mathematical
origin, it would, I conceive, have been very difficult to arrive at
them by the examination and comparison of particular cases.
Laws of Syllogism deduced from the Elective Calculus.
We shall take into account all propositions which can be made out of
the classes X, Y, Z, and referred to
any of the forms embraced in the following system,
A,  All Xs are Zs.
 A' ,  All notXs are Zs. 
E,  No Xs are Zs.
 E'
 No notXs are Zs, or 
   (All notXs are notZs.) 
I,  Some Xs are Zs.
 I' ,  Some notXs are Zs. 
O,  Some Xs are notZs.
 O' ,  Some notXs are notZs. 
It is necessary to recapitulate that quantity (universal and
particular) and quality (affirmative and negative) are understood to
belong to the
terms of propositions
(4) which is indeed the correct
view.
Thus, in the proposition All Xs are Ys, the
subject All Xs is universalaffirmative, the predicate
(some) Ys particularaffirmative.
In the proposition, Some Xs are Zs, both terms
are particularaffirmative.
The proposition No Xs are Zs would in
philosophical language be written in the form All Xs are
notZs. The subject is universalaffirmative, the
predicate particularnegative.
In the proposition Some Xs are notZs, the
subject is particularaffirmative, the predicate particularnegative.
In the proposition All notXs are Ys the subject
is universalnegative, the predicate particularaffirmative, and so
on.
In a pair of premises there are four terms, viz. two subjects and two
predicates; two of these terms, viz. those involving the Y
or notY may be called the middle terms, the two others the
extremes, one of these involving X or notX, the
other Z or notZ.
The following are then the conditions and the rules of inference.
Case 1st. The middle terms of like quality.
Condition of Inference. One middle term universal.
Rule. Equate the extremes.
Case 2nd. The middle terms of opposite qualities.
1st. Condition of Inference. One extreme universal.
Rule. Change the quantity and quality of that extreme, and equate the
result to the other extreme.
2nd. Condition of inference. Two universal middle terms.
Rule. Change the quantity and quality of either extreme, and equate
the result to the other extreme.
I add a few examples,
1st  All Ys are Xs. 
 All Zs are Ys. 
This belongs to Case 1. All Ys is the universal middle
term. The extremes equated give All Zs are Xs,
the stronger term becoming the subject.
2nd  All Xs are Ys  =  All Xs are Ys 
 No Zs are Ys   No Zs are notYs 
This belongs to Case 2, and satisfies the first condition. The middle
term is particularaffirmative in the first premise,
particularnegative in the second. Taking AllZs as the
universal extreme, we have, on changing its quantity and quality, Some
notZs, and this equated to the other extreme gives
All Xs are (some) notZs
= No Xs are Zs.
If we take All Xs as the universal extreme we get
No Zs are Xs.
3rd  All Xs are Ys. 
 Some Zs are notYs. 
This also belongs to Case 2, and satisfies the first condition. The
universal extreme All Xs becomes, some notXs,
whence
Some Zs are notXs.
4th  All Ys are Xs. 
 All notYs are Zs. 
This belongs to Case 2, and satisfies the second condition. The
extreme Some Xs becomes All notXs,
.·.
All notXs are Zs.
The other extreme treated in the same way would give
All notZs are Xs,
which is an equivalent result.
If we confine ourselves to the Aristotelian premises A, E, I, O, the
second condition of inference in Case 2 is not needed. The conclusion
will not necessarily be confined to the Aristotelian system.
Ex.  Some Ys are notXs  =  Some Ys are notXs 
 No Zs are Ys   All Zs are notYs 
This belongs to Case 2, and satisfies the first condition. The result
is
Some notZs are notXs.
These appear to me to be the ultimate laws of syllogistic inference.
They apply to every case, and they completely abolish the distinction
of figure, the necessity of conversion, the arbitrary and
(5)
rules of distribution, &c. If all logic were reducible to the
syllogism these might claim to be regarded as the rules of logic. But
logic, considered as the science of the relations of classes has been
shewn to be of far greater extent. Syllogistic inference, in the
elective system, corresponds to elimination. But this is not the
highest in the order of its processes. All questions of elimination
may in that system be regarded as subsidiary to the more general
problem of the solution of elective equations. To this problem all
questions of logic and of reasoning, without exception, may be
referred. For the fuller illustrations of this principle I must
however refer to the original work. The theory of hypothetical
propositions, the analysis of the positive and negative elements, into
which all propositions are ultimately resolvable, and other similar
topics are also there discussed.
Undoubtedly the final aim of speculative logic is to assign the
conditions which render reasoning possible, and the laws which
determine its character and expression. The general axiom (A) and the
laws (1), (2), (3), appear to convey the
most definite solution that can at present be given to this question.
When we pass to the consideration of hypothetical propositions, the
same laws and the same general axiom which ought perhaps also to be
regarded as a law, continue to prevail; the only difference being that
the subjects of thought are no longer classes of objects, but cases of
the coexistent truth or falsehood of propositions. Those relations
which logicians designate by the terms conditional, disjunctive, &c.,
are referred by Kant to distinct conditions of thought. But it is a
very remarkable fact, that the expressions of such relations can be
deduced the one from the other by mere analytical process. From the
equation
y =
vx, which expresses the
conditional
proposition, ``If the proposition Y is true the proposition X
is true,'' we can deduce
yx + (1  y)x + (1  y)(1  x) = 1,
which expresses the
disjunctive proposition, ``Either
Y and X are together true, or X is
true and Y is false, or they are both false,'' and again
the equation
y(1 
x) = 0, which expresses a relation of
coexistence,
viz. that the truth of Y and the
falsehood of X do not coexist. The distinction in the
mental regard, which has the best title to be regarded as fundamental,
is, I conceive, that of the affirmative and the negative. From this
we deduce the direct and the inverse in operations, the true and the
false in propositions, and the opposition of qualities in their
terms.
The view which these enquiries present of the nature of language is a
very interesting one. They exhibit it not as a mere collection of
signs, but as a system of expression, the elements of which are
subject to the laws of the thought which they represent. That those
laws are as rigorously mathematical as are the laws which govern the
purely quantitative conceptions of space and time, of number and
magnitude, is a conclusion which I do not hesitate to submit to the
exactest scrutiny.
Notes
(1)
The Mathematical Analysis of Logic, being an Essay towards a Calculus of Deductive Reasoning. Cambridge, Macmillan; London, G. Bell.
(2)
There are but two ways in which the proposition, No Xs are Ys, can be understood. 1st, In the sense of All Xs are notY. 2nd, In the sense of It is not true that any Xs are Ys, i.e. the proposition ``Some Xs are Ys'' is false. The former of these is a single categorical proposition. The latter is
an assertion respecting a proposition, and its expression belongs to a distinct part of the elective system. It appears to me that it is the latter sense, which is really adopted by those who refer the negative, not, to the copula. To refer it to the predicate is not a useless refinement, but a necessary step, in order to make the proposition truly a
relation between classes. I believe it will be found that this step is really taken in the attempts to demonstrate the Aristotelian rules of distribution.
The transposition of the negative is a very common feature of language. Habit renders us almost insensible to it in our own language, but when in another language the same principle is differently exhibited, as in the Greek, for , it claims attention.
(3)
This conclusion may be illustrated and
verified by considering an example such as the following.
Let  x denote all steamers, or steamvessels, 
 y denote all armed vessels, 
 z denote all vessels of the Mediterranean. 
Equation (
a) would then express that
armed steamers
consist of the armed vessels of the Mediterranean and the
steamvessels not of the Mediterranean. From this it follows 
(1) That there are no armed vessels except steamers in the
Mediterranean.
(2) That all unarmed steamers are in the Mediterranean (since the
steamvessels not of the Mediterranean are armed). Hence we infer
that
the vessels of the Mediterranean consist of all unarmed
steamers; any number of armed steamers; and any number of unarmed
vessels without steam. This, expressed symbolically, is equation
(15).
(4)
When
propositions are said to be affected with
quantity and quality, the quality is really that of the
predicate, which expresses the
nature of the assertion,
and the quantity that of the
subject, which shews its extent.
(5)
Partial, because they have reference only to the
quantity of the X, even when the proposition relates to the
notX. It would be possible to construct an exact
counterpart to the Aristotelian rules of syllogism, by quantifying
only the notX. The system in the text is
symmetrical because it is complete.
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